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Peak Coordinating Bodies and Invasive Alien 
Species: Is the Whole Worth More Than the 
Sum of Its Parts? 
SOPHIE RILEY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Invasive alien species (IAS) are alien species that threaten 
ecosystems, habitats or other species.1 The threats posed by IAS have 
been extensively documented,2 and include predation on native species, 
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Robinson from the Invasive Non-Native Species Policy Rural and Environment Directorate for 
assisting in face to face meetings. All errors and omissions remain the author’s. The research 
undertaken for this paper was partly funded through a grant from the Public Purpose Fund of the 
Law Society of New South Wales, Australia and partly through a study leave grant from the 
University of Technology Sydney. Research assistance provided by Cleary Castrission is 
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 1. U.N.E.P., Alien Species: Guiding Principles for the Prevention, Introduction and 
Mitigation of Impacts, 5th Meeting, Jan. 31–Feb. 4, 2000, 257, UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/5/5 (Oct. 
22, 1999).  
 2. Ted Center, et al., Biological Invasions: Stemming the Tide in Florida, 1 FLA. 
ENTOMOLOGIST 45, 78 (1995); Steve L. Coles & Lucius G. Eldredge, Nonindigenous Species 
Introductions on Coral Reefs: A Need for Information, 56 PACIFIC SCIENCE 191 (2002); Lyle 
Glowka, Bioprospecting, Alien Invasive Species, and Hydrothermal Vents: Three Emerging Legal 
Issues in the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 329 (1999–
2000); Lyle Glowka & Cyril de Klemm, International Instrument, Processes and Non-indigenous 
Species Introductions–Is a Protocol Necessary?, 27 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 247 (1997); Peter 
Jenkins, Paying for Protection from Invasive Species, 67 ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
(Fall 2002) available at http://www.issues.org/19.1/jenkins.htm; Todd E. McDowell, Slow-
Motion Explosion: The Global Threat of Exotic Species and the International Response to the 
Problem in the South Pacific, 9 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 187 (1998); Jeff McNeely, 
Invasive Species; A Costly Catastrophe for Native Biodiversity, Land Use and Water Resources 
Research (2002) available at http://www.luwrr.com/uploads/paper01-02.pdf; Anne M. Perrault & 
William Carroll Muffett; Turning Off the Tap: A Strategy to Address International Aspects of 
Invasive Alien Species, 11 (2) REVIEW OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 211 (2002); GLOBAL INVASIVE SPECIES PROGRAMME (GISP), GLOBAL 
STRATEGY ON INVASIVE ALIEN SPECIES (Jeffrey A. McNeely et al. eds. 2001), available at  
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modification of habitat, and introduction of pests and diseases.3 Each of 
these impacts has the potential to lead to a decline in biodiversity, 
including irreversible outcomes such as species’ extinctions.4 Notorious 
examples of IAS include rabbits and cane toads in Australia,5 the Giant 
African Snail and Red Imported Fire Ant in the United States of 
America (US),6 and grey squirrels and the Chinese Mitten Crab in the 
United Kingdom.7 It is telling that, at the time of writing, each of these 
examples are also categorized by the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as one of the 100 worst invasive species 
in the world.8   
Although governments are increasingly aware of the need to 
develop effective IAS regimes, regulators face many challenges. To 
start with, IAS regimes rarely start from a clean slate. Indeed, they often 
derive from measures initially designed to protect primary production 
from pests and diseases. Accordingly, in many jurisdictions, IAS 
regulation is best developed for the agricultural product sector and 
represents what has been described as a “crisis” response to a chronic 
problem.9 As such, regulation is often fragmentary, with gaps in 
coverage interposed by areas of overlap. Moreover, the design and 
 
http://www.fws.gov/invasives/volunteersTrainingModule/pdf/bigpicture/globalstrategy.pdf; Marc 
L. Miller & Lance Gunderson, Biological and Cultural Camouflage: The Challenges of Seeing 
the Harmful Invasive Species Problem and Doing Something About It, in HARMFUL INVASIVE 
SPECIES: LEGAL RESPONSES (Marc Miller and Robert Fabian, eds., Environmental Law Institute 
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=452982.  
 3. CLAIRE SHINE, NATTLEY WILLIAMS, AND LOTHAR GüNDING, A GUIDE TO DESIGNING 
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS ON ALIEN INVASIVE SPECIES 1.4 (2000).  
 4. AN INVENTORY OF ALIEN SPECIES AND THEIR THREAT TO BIODIVERSITY AND 
ECONOMY IN SWITZERLAND 9 (Rüdiger Wittenberg ed., 2005) [hereinafter AN INVENTORY OF 
ALIEN SPECIES]; Stokes, K., O'Neill, K. & McDonald, Invasive Species in Ireland 
(2004)(unpublished Report to Environment & Heritage Service and National Parks & Wildlife 
Service); State of the Environment Report, Environment Protection Authority 1997, ¶ 2.6 (NSW) 
(Austl.); GREG SHERLEY AND SARAH LOWE TOWARDS A REGIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES 
STRATEGY FOR THE SOUTH PACIFIC: ISSUES AND OPTIONS, 1 (2000).  
 5. DEPARTMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY, ENVIRONMENT, WATER, POPULATION AND 
COMMUNITIES: FERAL ANIMALS IN AUSTRALIA, available at 
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/invasive/ferals/index.html (last visited Nov. 2012).  
 6. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES INFORMATION CENTRE: LIST OF INVASIVE ANIMALS, 
http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/animals/main.shtml (last visited Nov. 2012). The Zebra 
Mussel is also a notorious invasive species in the United States of America.  
 7. U.K. FORESTRY COMMISSION: SQUIRRELS AND ENGLAND’S WOODLANDS (2013), 
http://www.forestry.gov.uk/greysquirrel; Chinese Mitten Crab, Factsheet, Woodlands (2006) (last 
visited Sept. 2011); Chinese Mitten Crab, NATURAL HISTORY MUSEUM (2013), 
http://www.nhm.ac.uk/nature-online/life/other-invertebrates/chinese-mitten-crabs/index.html (last 
visited Sept. 2011).  
 8. 100 of the World’s Worst Invasive Species, INVASIVE SPECIES SPECIALIST GROUP 
(2008), available at http://www.issg.org/worst100_species.html (last visited Sept. 2011).  
 9. DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS WORKING GROUP, REVIEW OF NON-
NATIVE SPECIES POLICY REPORT, 2003, DEFRA at 21–22 (U.K.) [hereinafter FOOD AND RURAL 
AFFAIRS]; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, STATUS AND TRENDS IN STATE INVASIVE SPECIES 
POLICY: 2002-2009 (2010).  
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implementation of measures is further complicated by the presence of a 
range of jurisdictions, government agencies, and interest groups. Part of 
the problem flows from the tendency of each unit to consider the IAS 
problem according to its specific remit and thus in isolation from the 
regime as a whole. Hence, a common but problematic challenge for 
regulators is deciding how to coordinate and synthesize processes across 
many lines of responsibility and levels of government.10 
To deal with these types of challenges, authorities in jurisdictions 
such as the US and Great Britain (GB) have established peak bodies to 
coordinate the regulatory response to IAS. These bodies are well-placed 
to consider the “big picture” and to take the lead in implementing 
initiatives that can draw the regime together, including: developing 
overarching policy, defining an IAS, providing services, such as one-
stop information portals, and fostering community engagement. In this 
study, these types of bodies are described as “peak coordinating bodies” 
(PCBs). In Australia, the use of PCBs has been dismissed, primarily on 
the basis that they duplicate systems and procedures already established 
at the Federal, State and Territory levels.  
The purpose of this paper is to undertake a comparative study of 
IAS regulation in Australia, the US and GB in order to evaluate whether 
coordination mechanisms instituted by way of a peak body duplicate 
processes found at other levels of government; or whether such bodies 
add value to existing regulation by fostering a greater level of efficiency 
than would otherwise flow from the individual components of the 
regime. Australia, the US and GB have been selected for discussion 
because they illustrate different approaches for dealing with the IAS 
challenge in the context of multi-layered systems of regulation.  
The Australian regime operates within a Federal system of 
government and is characterized by a large volume of law and policy 
that lacks an overarching coordinating body.11 By way of contrast, the 
US regime, which also operates within a Federal system, enjoys the 
benefit of a peak coordinating body that targets IAS-related activities 
across a range of Federal departments and bureaus.12 The US body, 
however, has no direct power with respect to State and Territory 
agencies. Great Britain has similarly adopted a coordinated approach to 
IAS by establishing the GB Non-Native Species Coordination 
 
 10. U.N.E.P., supra note 1, ¶¶ 10 (b), (c), (d) and (f); DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL 
AFFAIRS,THE INVASIVE NON-NATIVE SPECIES FRAMEWORK STRATEGY FOR GREAT BRITAIN 
(2008) [hereinafter NON-NATIVE SPECIES FRAMEWORK]; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, 
supra note 9, at 15.  
 11. Sophie Riley, Law is Order, and Good Law is Good Order: the Role of Governance in 
the Regulation of Invasive Alien Species, 1 ENVTL. & PLAN. L. J. 16, 27 (2012).  
 12. NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, http://www.invasivespecies.gov (last visited Nov. 
2012).  
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Mechanism.13 While GB does not operate as a Federal system of 
government, regulators still need to take into account the power of 
semi-autonomous parliaments, such as those established in Scotland and 
Wales. Accordingly, as with Australia and the US, GB also faces many 
real-world difficulties in coordinating initiatives across an array of 
processes and jurisdictions. 
The comparative methodology adopted for this study is largely 
based on the functionalist approach that focuses on similarities among 
the three jurisdictions. In doing so, however, the writer is mindful of the 
lively debate surrounding the functionalist versus contextualist 
approaches and the practicality of using functionalism as a “rule of 
thumb.”14 Accordingly, while the legal rules and institutions of the three 
jurisdictions can be roughly compared, some rules and institutions may 
appear similar, but operate in different ways, and vice versa.15 The study 
further combines what Professor Jaakko Husa has described as the 
“legislator’s standpoint,” with the “harmonizer’s standpoint” to search 
for models as solutions to problems.16 The “legislator’s standpoint” 
critiques the models against the Australian system; while the 
“harmonizer’s standpoint” searches for the “best” model.17  
This paper will provide a short overview of the systems of 
government applied in Australia, the US and GB, and explain how this 
impacts the design and implementation of their IAS regimes. This paper 
will then examine the IAS regimes themselves, highlighting the use of 
peak bodies, related institutions and coordinating mechanisms. This 
paper argues that coordination is essential to the effective operation of 
IAS regimes and that in order to achieve this objective, it is crucial to 
establish peak bodies that can act as a focal point for open dialogue and 
consistency of approach.  
II.  SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT: AUSTRALIA, UNITED STATES  
AND GREAT BRITAIN 
An examination of the systems of government in Australia, the US 
 
 13. GB NON-NATIVE SPECIES COORDINATION MECHANISM, 
https://secure.fera.defra.gov.uk/nonnativespecies/home/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 2012).  
 14. See, e.g., Jaakko Husa & Jan Smits, A Dialogue on Comparative Functionalism, 18 
MASSTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 554 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1965933.  
 15. Id.  
 16. COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: CASE STUDIES AND 
METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, AUG. 15–17 2007, FINNISH ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE 5, 
available at http://www.aka.fi/Tiedostot/Tiedostot/ENVLAW/comparative%20report.pdf; see 
also Lin Harmon, Teaching Environmental Law from a Global Resources Perspective, Paper 
Presented at the 10th Annual Colloquium of the IUCN Academy of Environmental Law (July 
2012).  
 17. Id.  
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and GB18 is important to developing an understanding of the policy and 
legislative context of IAS regimes in each jurisdiction. In particular, it 
helps to explain constitutional and political limitations on the exercise 
of power by a centralized authority, which in turn shapes attitudes 
towards the creation of PCBs. 
Australia is established as a constitutional monarchy with a 
Federal system of government. In accordance with the Commonwealth 
of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) (“Australian Constitution”), 
law-making powers are shared between the Federal, State and Territory 
parliaments.19 The majority of powers available to the Federal 
government are the “concurrent” powers, set out in section 51 of the 
Australian Constitution.20 In theory, these powers are exercisable by 
both the State and Federal parliaments;21 however the High Court of 
Australia has interpreted many of these powers as falling within the 
exclusive domain of the Federal parliament.22 Any matters not referred 
to in the Australian constitution are known as the residual powers, 
which are exercisable solely by the States and Territories.23 The 
environment is not specifically mentioned in section 51; hence, until the 
early 1980s it was presumed that, in line with land and resource 
management, the exercise of environmental regulation was a residual 
power vested in State and Territory parliaments.24 Such powers 
extended to dealings with weeds, feral animals and other agricultural 
pests.25 
 
 18. Although the paper later mentions devolved powers in Northern Ireland, the focus 
remains on England, Scotland and Wales, which together comprise Great Britain. Hence the term 
Great Britain is used in this paper, rather than the term, United Kingdom, which would also 
include Northern Ireland.  
 19. Australia’s Federal system of government comprises: the Federal or Commonwealth 
government, the governments of the six states (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, 
Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia) and the two territories (the Northern Territory 
and the Australian Capital Territory).  
 20. A small number of powers, largely those found in section 52, are exercisable exclusively 
by the Federal parliament. These powers primarily relate to the seat of government of the 
Commonwealth and places acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes.  
 21. These powers include quarantine under section 51(ix), census and statistics under 
section 51 (xi) and the external affairs under section 51(xxix). In situations of conflict between 
valid State and Federal laws, section 109 of the Constitution provides that State law gives way to 
the extent of the inconsistency; see Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1.  
 22. See, e.g., TONY BLACKSHIELD, GEORGE WILLIAMS, & BRIAN F. FITZGERALD, 
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY, 325–74, 885–929 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing 
the interpretation of the Constitution and the scope of the external affairs power therein).  
 23. The residual legislative power that the States have covers a wide range of matters, 
including health, education and the environment.  
 24. Australian Senate, Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts 
Committee Commonwealth Environment Powers, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (1999) ¶ 
2.1–14, 6.1.  
 25. See, e.g., Agriculture and Related Resources Protection Act, 1976 (W. Austl.); 
Agriculture and Related Resources Protection Act 1976 (WA) (Austl.); Plant Diseases Act 1924 
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In 1983, however, the High Court of Australia held that the 
external affairs power in section 51(xxix) of the Australian Constitution 
“authorizes a law which gives effect to an obligation imposed on 
Australia by a bona fide international convention or treaty to which 
Australia is a party . . . .”26 While this power extends to environmental 
matters, it has never endowed the Federal government with a carte 
blanche to legislate across the board for protection of the environment.27 
Key restrictions center on the proportionality between the purpose of 
the treaty and the means by which the law seeks to achieve that 
purpose.28 Notwithstanding these limitations, Australia is a signatory to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and is thus under 
obligation to comply with the convention, including article 8(h), which 
specifies that members should “prevent the introduction of, or control or 
eradicate those alien species which threaten” biodiversity.29 It is 
arguable that the Federal government could have legislated in a broad 
manner to provide uniform regulation with respect to the deleterious 
impacts of IAS. 
As just noted, however, land and resource management, including 
the regulation of what are now termed IAS, has historically been a 
matter for determination by the States and Territories,30 with some 
legislation pre-dating the Australian Constitution.31 By 1992, when 
Australia ratified the CBD, State and Territory initiatives had already 
extended across a range of IAS-related matters, including stopping the 
introduction and spread of pests and diseases,32 as well as protecting 
rural land.33  
Consequently, even if the Federal Government were mindful of 
legislating for broad-scale IAS management, such regulation would 
intersect with pre-existing arrangements already established by the 
States and Territories.34 Indeed, the 1980s saw increasing debate on how 
 
(NSW) (Austl.); Plant Diseases Control Act 1979 (NT) (Austl.).  
 26. Commonwealth v Tasmania, (1983) 158 CLR 1, ¶ 5 (Austl.); see also Jacqueline Peel & 
Lee Godden, Australian Environmental Management: A ‘Dams’ Story, 28 U.N.S.W.L.J. 668, 
668–75 (2005).  
 27. See James Crawford, The Constitution and the Environment, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 11, 
21–24 (1991).  
 28. Commonwealth, supra note 26, ¶ 54. 
 29. Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 8(h), [1992], 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (Austl.). 
The Convention entered into force December, 29 1993. It had 193 Parties as of November 2012.  
 30. GERRY BATES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 76 (6th ed. 2006).  
 31. The Australian State of Victoria, for example, introduced the Thistle Act 1890 (Vic) to 
oversee the eradication of thistles some ten years before Federation.  
 32. See generally Plant Diseases Act 1924 (NSW) (Austl.); Noxious Weeds Act 1921 (ACT); 
Stock Diseases Act 1923 (NSW); Noxious Weed Act 1950 (WA); and Vermin and Noxious Weeds 
Act 1958 (Vic).  
 33. See, e.g., Pastures Protection Act 1934, (N.S.W.) (Austl.).  
 34. BATES, supra note 30, at 76.  
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Federal, State, and Territory Governments could create “mutually 
agreed institutional and policy-making mechanisms” that took into 
account governance concerns stemming from each level of 
government.35 The pathway eventually chosen was a political one, 
designated “co-operative Federalism.” 
 Co-operative Federalism operates through the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG), which is a peak inter-governmental 
body established in 1992. The members of COAG consist of the Prime 
Minister of Australia, the Premiers of each of the six States, the Chief 
Ministers of the two Territories and the President of the Australian 
Local Government Association. COAG’s decisions are made by 
consensus and the Council develops and monitors the implementation of 
policy reforms that are of national significance. The latter are 
determined by consultation amongst ministers, including at meetings of 
COAG. COAG is assisted by the operation of Commonwealth-State 
Ministerial Councils (Ministerial Councils), and the development of 
Intergovernmental Agreements and national strategies.36 The regulation 
of IAS is not designated as a matter of national significance. Hence, the 
Federal government does not provide a comprehensive regulatory 
regime for dealing with these species.37 Rather, as discussed below, the 
regime is characterized by a mix of laws and strategies that deal with 
individual aspects of the IAS problem.  
 The US is similarly governed by a Federal system of government.  
Unlike Australia, however, the US is established as a Federal 
constitutional republic with an elected president as head-of-state rather 
than the reigning monarch of the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding this 
fundamental difference, the US and Australian parliamentary systems 
have much in common. To begin with, law-making powers in both 
jurisdictions are shared between a centralized government and 
state/territory governments. In addition, both jurisdictions enjoy the 
benefit of a written constitution that enumerates heads of power that the 
respective Federal parliaments can exercise. In the Constitution of the 
United States (“US Constitution”), these include powers found in 
Article I, section 8, authorizing the US parliament (Congress) to 
legislate on matters such as the coining of currency,38 the maintenance 
of military forces39 and the regulation of commerce with foreign 
 
 35. Id.  
 36. Other institutions include specialist sub-committees. See BATES, supra note 30, at 78.  
 37. In accordance with the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(Cth) matters of national environmental significance are: world heritage properties, national 
heritage places, wetlands of international importance, listed threatened species and ecological 
communities, migratory species, Commonwealth marine areas, the Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park and nuclear actions.  
 38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.  
 39. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 13.  
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countries.40 Matters not precisely listed in Article I, section 8 are 
classified as “residual” powers that fall within the legislative domain of 
the states and territories. As with the Australian Constitution, the US 
Constitution does not specifically refer to the environment, this 
traditionally being regarded as a matter under state and territory 
jurisdiction. 
The structure of both the Australian and US constitutions evinces a 
clear intent to leave a large volume of “residual” powers in the hands of 
the States41 and to create Federal legislatures with limited central 
powers.42 In both jurisdictions, however, judicial interpretation of the 
constitution has led to a different result.43 As already noted, in Australia, 
an expansive interpretation of the external affairs power has given the 
Federal government a potentially wide ambit over environmental 
matters; while in the US, a similar result has been achieved by the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the commerce power and the 
provisions in Article VI, clause 2 of the US Constitution, which 
specifies that treaties are the “supreme law of the land.”44 In Missouri v 
Holland, the Supreme Court interpreted this clause and Article II, 
section 2, which relates to the President’s power to enter into treaties, to 
allow Federal laws to override State laws where the Federal law is 
designed to give effect to a treaty.45 
One point of difference between the US and Australia is that the 
US has not ratified the CBD and has not, therefore, accepted obligations 
with respect to Article 8(h) of that convention.46 Consequently, attempts 
by Congress to introduce uniform IAS regulation that conflict with State 
laws may run afoul of the Missouri v Holland doctrine. It is, however, 
 
 40. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 41. James A. Thompson, American and Australian Constitutions: Continuing Adventures in 
Comparative Constitutional Law, 30 J. MARSHALL. L. REV. 627 (1996–97). Notwithstanding this 
intent, it should also be kept in mind that the constitutions of Australia and the US contain other 
provisions that may curtail the exercise of power by states. For example, Sections 9 and 10 of 
Article I of the US Constitution limit the exercise of legislative power by both state and federal 
governments so that neither may grant any title of nobility.  In Australia, section 52 of the 
Australian Constitution sets out powers that may be exercised exclusively by the federal 
government.  
 42. Id. at 652–53; see generally TONY BLACKSHIELD & GEORGE WILLIAMS, supra note 22 
(discussing generally the interpretation of the Constitution and the scope of the external affairs 
power).  
 43. Thomson, supra note 41, at 652–53.  
 44. LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., METHODS OF INTERPRETATION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT 
READS THE CONSTITUTION 344 (2009).  
 45. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).  
 46. The US, however, is a member of other international treaties that relate to IAS, including 
the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, adopted 15 April 1994, 
[1995] ATS No 8, 1 (entered into force 1 January 1995). As of November 2012, the WTO has 
157 members. The Marrakesh Agreement consists of the agreement to set up the WTO and a 
number of annexures, including the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures that influences the design and implementation of national quarantine regimes.  
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arguable that the US would be liable under customary international law, 
with respect to the deleterious impacts of IAS that emanate from its 
territory, although the precise nature and extent of such obligations are 
not clearly delineated.47 Notwithstanding these ambiguities, the fact 
remains that IAS are a threat to US biodiversity;48 and the Federal 
government has responded to this challenge by proclaiming Executive 
Order 13112 on Invasive Alien Species (Executive Order 13112).49 
Executive orders operate as an addition to the legislative powers of 
Congress. They are legally binding orders issued by the President that 
give direction to Federal agencies and departments in the exercise of 
their functions under existing laws. Accordingly, following the issuing 
of Executive Order 13112 by President Clinton on February 3, 1999, 
provisions of the order applied directly to Federal agencies and 
departments, but not State agencies.50 The order itself is designed to 
prevent the introduction of, and otherwise regulate, invasive species.  
Unlike the US, and similar to Australia, the UK is a constitutional 
monarchy. The UK, however, does not have a written constitution. 
Instead, its constitution is found in sources such as treaties, legislation, 
judicial pronouncements, and formative instruments, including the 
Magna Carta.51 Prior to 1997 the UK was governed by the parliament at 
Westminster, that comprising the House of Commons, the House of 
Lords and the reigning monarch. This parliament had power to legislate 
for environmental matters across the board, including with respect to 
IAS.52 
Since 1997, however, the UK government has followed a 
decentralization policy, which amongst other things, has generated a 
devolution of environmental law-making powers. The UK has, for 
example, devolved legislative power on a Scottish unicameral 
Parliament that now legislates on a wide range of matters, including 
 
 47. See generally Sophie Riley, Preventing Transboundary Harm from Invasive Alien 
Species, 18 REV. OF EUROPEAN CMTY. & INT’L L.  198 (2009).  
 48. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, Factsheet on Invasive Species, 
http://www.invasivespecies.gov/Factsheets/Issue_Overview.pdf  (last visited Nov. 2012).  
 49. The preamble to Executive Order No 13112 on Invasive Alien Species, states, “the 
authority to make the order is vested in the President by virtue of: the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), the Non-indigenous Aquatic Nuisance 
Prevention and Control Act of 1990, as amended (16 U.S.C. 4701 et seq.), the Lacey Act, as 
amended (18 U.S.C. 42), the Federal Plant Pest Act (7 U.S.C. 150aa et seq.), the Federal 
Noxious Weed Act of 1974, as amended (7 U.S.C. 2801 et seq.), and the Endangered Species Act 
of 1973, as amended (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.).” Exec. Order No. 13112, 3 C.F.R. 159 (1999), 
available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/eos/eo13112.html (last visited Nov. 2012).  
 50. See Exec. Order No. 13112, supra note 49.  
 51. For sources and commentary on the constitutional conventions of the UK, see generally 
MALCOLM JACK ET AL., ERSKINE MAY’S TREATISE ON THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS 
AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT (23rd ed. 2011).  
 52. See, e.g., Countryside Act, 1968, c. 41 (Eng.); Prevention of Oil Pollution Act, 1971, c. 
60 (Eng.).  
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education, health and the environment; although not on matters 
“reserved” for the UK government, such as currency, national security 
and foreign policy.53 In a similar vein, legislative power has also been 
devolved to the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly.54 As England does not have its own separate parliament, 
Westminster, the Parliament of the UK, undertakes legislative functions 
for England.55 Following the process of devolution, representatives of 
the governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
entered into a memorandum of understanding that created a Joint 
Ministerial Committee.56 Part of the function of the Committee is to 
facilitate discussion on the way that devolved powers are implemented 
in different parts of the UK.57  
At first glance, the system of government in the UK appears to be 
“quasi- Federal” because it involves sharing law-making powers 
amongst Westminster and the legislative institutions of Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. As England, however, does not have its own 
parliament and is ruled directly from Westminster, the UK lacks a true 
sharing of powers, as opposed to Australia and the US. At the same 
time, Australia, the US and the UK operate under multi-layers of 
governments, agencies and departments. Accordingly, regulators face 
similar problems, particularly with respect to coordinating policies, 
activities and competing values across the range of institutions that 
touch upon IAS. Indeed, as will be discussed in the next section, the 
need to implement effective coordination mechanisms is a common 
policy theme in all three jurisdictions; yet, governance structures and 
regulation vary greatly.  
 
 53. Scotland Act, 1998, sched. 5, (Eng.).  
 54. Devolution did not occur uniformly through the UK. For example, the National 
Assembly for Wales derives the majority of its legislative powers from the Government of Wales 
Act 2006. Unlike the devolution of power to Scotland, the Government of Wales Act 1998 
merely permitted the National Assembly of Wales to make secondary legislation as authorised by 
the UK Parliament. With respect to Northern Ireland, the Belfast Agreement established the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and, in accordance with section of 4 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, 
devolved powers to the Assembly are the equivalent of “transferred powers”. Devolution of 
powers was suspended in 2002 and restored in 2007 with the entry into force of the Northern 
Ireland Act 2006.  
 55. Peter Leyland, Devolution, the British Constitution and the Distribution of Power, 53 N. 
IR. LEGAL Q. 408, 413–16 (2002).  
 56. UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT, THE SCOTTISH MINISTERS, THE WELSH MINISTERS, 
AND THE NORTHERN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND 
SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS, 2010, Cm. 7864, ¶¶ 23–25 Part I.  
 57. Id. at A1.2(b).  
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III.  IAS REGIMES: AUSTRALIA, THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT  BRITAIN 
1.  Australia 
In Australia, the Federal Parliament has enacted the Quarantine 
Act, 1908 (Cth) (The Quarantine Act) and the Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act), both of 
which are important to the regulation of IAS.58 The former statute is 
intended to prevent or control the introduction of pests, diseases and 
IAS, including those that impact the environment.59 The Quarantine Act 
is supported by regulations and proclamations such as Quarantine 
Proclamation 1998,60 which prohibits the entry of animals, plants and 
their products into Australia, unless they are already on an authorized 
list, or have been assessed and granted a permit for their importation.61 
Although the Quarantine Act establishes border controls to prevent the 
entry of unwanted species, it does not deal with permitted species that 
develop into an IAS. Nor does the Act deal with species already present 
in Australia, such as those introduced prior to 1998, that prove to be 
invasive. 
At the time of writing, the Federal Parliament released a draft 
exposure of the Biosecurity Bill 2012.62 The Bill updates Australia’s 
biosecurity arrangements, yet apart from one or two isolated examples, 
such as the regulation of ballast water, does not fully engage with the 
linkages stemming from invasive alien species, biosecurity and the 
environment.63 Accordingly, if a species proves to be invasive, it is still 
largely left to the states and territories to implement their own 
measures.64  
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act), was designed to fulfil Australia’s international 
obligations under various international instruments, including Article 
 
 58. Quarantine Act No. 3 of 1908 (Cth) s 4(b) (Austl.); Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Austl.).  
 59. Quarantine Act No. 3 of 1908, supra note 58. References to the environment were added 
to the Quarantine Act after the Nairn Report recommended that the scope of quarantine should be 
extended to the natural environment. See M. E. NAIRN, P. G. ALLEN, A. R. INGLIS AND C. 
TANNER, AUSTRALIAN QUARANTINE: A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY ¶ 2.2.4 (1996).  
 60. Quarantine Proclamation 1998 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/legislation/legislativeinstrumentcompilation1.nsf/current/byti
tle/AE38C4F883931ACECA256FC60003F7DB?OpenDocument&mostrecent=1.  
 61. Essentially, only plant seeds listed in Schedule 5 of Quarantine Proclamation are 
permitted entry. All other importation of plant and animal products must undergo a risk 
assessment. Quarantine Act No. 3 of 1908, supra note 58.  
 62. Exposure Draft: Biosecurity Bill 2012 (Cth) (Austl.).  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 4.  
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8(h) of the Convention on Biological Diversity.65 That article stipulates 
that parties are under obligation to prevent or control the introduction of 
species that threaten biodiversity.66 One means afforded by the EPBC 
for complying with that provision is to list the deleterious impacts of 
IAS as a “key threatening process.”67 Indeed, numerous key threatening 
processes directly related to IAS have been accepted for listing,  
including: predation, competition and land degradation by rabbits, feral 
cats, rats; and loss of biodiversity caused by the yellow crazy ant, cane 
toads and the red fire ant.68 Once a threatening process has been listed, 
the Minister must prepare a threat-abatement plan, but only if he or she 
considers that such a plan is a “feasible, effective and efficient way to 
abate the process.”69  
The listing process is not infallible, as demonstrated by the events 
surrounding the listing of escaped garden plants as a key threatening 
process.70 In January 2010, the Minister accepted that “Loss and 
Degradation of Native Plant and Animal Habitat by Invasion of Escaped 
Garden Plants, Including Aquatic Plants,” should be listed as a key 
threatening process under the EPBC.71 At the same time, the Minister 
also decided that a threat abatement plan was not a feasible, effective or 
efficient way to abate the process because existing institutions 
established under the auspices of the Australian Weeds Strategy were 
sufficient to deal with escaped garden plans.72 Yet, gaps and 
inconsistencies with weed regulation in Australia are notorious and have 
been well documented in the literature.73   
 
 65. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (Austl.) 
[hereinafter EPBC Act].  
 66. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 29.  
 67. See EPBC Act, supra note 65, §§ 528, 188(4). A “threatening process” is defined as one 
that threatens the survival, abundance, or evolutionary development of a native species or 
ecological community.  
 68. Listed Key Threatening Processes, (Nov. 25, 2009), AUSTRALIAN GOV’T 
DEPT. OF SUSTAINABILITY ENV’T, WATER, POPULATION AND COMMUNITIES, (Nov. 25, 2009),  
available at http://www.environment.gov.au/cgi-bin/sprat/public/publicgetkeythreats (last visited 
Mar. 2011).  
 69. EPBC Act, supra note 65, § 270A(2).  
 70. Threatened Species Scientific Committee, Advice to the Minister for the Environment, 
Heritage and the Arts from the Threatened Species Scientific Committee (the Committee) on 
Amendments to the List of Key Threatening Processes under the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act), Australian Gov’t Dept. of Sustainability Env’t, 
Water, Population and Communities, available at 
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/threatened/ktp/pubs/garden-plants-listing-advice.pdf 
(last visited June 2011).  
 71. Id.  
 72. Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australian Weeds Strategy, 
Australian Government, Australian Weeds Committee, 9 (2006).  
 73. RICHARD GROVES, ROBERT BODEN & MARK LONSDALE, JUMPING THE GARDEN 
FENCE: INVASIVE PLANTS IN AUSTRALIA AND THEIR ENVIRONMENTAL AND AGRICULTURAL 
IMPACTS 29, 71, 73 (WWF-Australia, 2005); PAUL MARTIN, ROBYN BARTEL, JACK SINDEN, 
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The Federal government has also developed a number of strategies 
and plans that relate to IAS. These include the Australian Weeds 
Strategy and the Australian Pest Animal Strategy, as well as Australia’s 
Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 2010-2030.74 Marine pests, in 
particular, have been the target of concerted efforts.75 In 2005, the 
Federal, State and Territory governments negotiated the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on a National System for the Prevention 
and Management of Marine Pest Incursions.76 The Agreement provides 
for cooperative efforts,77 consistency of measures and the establishment 
of a National Standing Committee to coordinate measures.78  
At the State and Territory levels, authorities have established 
regimes for dealing with the eradication and control of declared animals 
and weeds,79 as well as regulation of species that impact on the natural 
environment.80 In the latter case, some states, such as New South Wales, 
have drafted Invasive Species Plans;81 while in other cases, legislation 
provides for listing the deleterious impacts of IAS as a threatening 
process.82  
 
NEIL GUNNINGHAM, IAN HANNAM, DEVELOPING A GOOD REGULATORY PRACTICE MODEL FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS IMPACTING ON FARMERS – OVERVIEW, RESEARCH REPORT, 2 
23 (2007), available at http://lwa.gov.au/files/products/social-and-institutional-research-
program/pk071355/pk071355.pdf; JACK SNIDEN, RANDALL JONES, SUSIE HESTER et al., THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF WEEDS IN AUSTRALIA, 25 (Mar. 2004), available at 
http://www.southwestnrm.org.au/sites/default/files/uploads/ihub/sinden-j-et-al-2003-economic-
impact-weeds-australia.pdf.  
 74. NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT MINISTERIAL COUNCIL (AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, 
DEP’T OF SUSTAINABILITY, ENV’T, WATER, POPULATION AND COMMUNITIES), AUSTRALIA’S 
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION STRATEGY 2010-2030, 9 (2010), available at 
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/publications/strategy-2010-30/pubs/biodiversity-
strategy-2010.pdf.  
 75. Id. at 24; Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australian Pest Animal 
Strategy – A National Strategy for the Management of Vertebrate Pest Animals in Australia, 
DEP’T OF THE ENV’T AND WATER RES. (i) (2007), available at 
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/invasive/publications/pubs/pest-animal-strategy.pdf 
(Aus.) [hereinafter NRMMC]; Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australian 
Weeds Strategy, Australian Government, Australian Weeds Committee, iv (2006).  
 76. Intergovernmental Agreement on a National System for the Prevention and Management 
of Marine Pest Incursions, 
http://www.marinepests.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/772864/Marine_IGA.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 2012).  
 77. Id. at 3–6.  
 78. Id. at 6.  
 79. See, e.g., Agriculture and Related Resources Protection Act, 1976 (W. Austl.) 40  
(Austl.), Catchment and Land Protection Act, 1994 (Vict.) 95–140 (Austl.), Plant Quarantine 
Act, 1997 (Tas.) (Austl.), Weeds Management Act, 2001 (N. Terr.) 5–10 (Austl.).  
 80. Catchment and Land Protection Act, supra note 79, at 9; Plant Quarantine Act, supra 
note 79.  
 81. New South Wales Invasive Species Plan 2008-2015, N.S.W. GOV’T DEP’T. OF INDUS., 
(Aug. 2008), http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/236900/nsw-invasive-
species-plan.pdf.  
 82. Threatened Species Conservation Act, 1995 (N.S.W.) s 6 (Austl.). Not all Australian 
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The consequence of this assortment of instruments is that while 
Australian policy highlights the importance of establishing an effective 
IAS regime, the regime itself operates in a piecemeal, fragmented and 
inconsistent manner.83 Indeed, the major piece of legislation dealing 
with protection of biodiversity at the Commonwealth level—the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(CTH)—contains few special provisions to deal with IAS.84 Section 
301A does stipulate that regulations may be promulgated to tackle IAS, 
yet to date only one regulation has been made:85  Regulation 12.66 that 
allows a park warden to implement measures in a Commonwealth 
reserve to control or remove non-native species.86  
Given the fragmented and ad hoc development of the regime, 
environmental groups have long called for more effective leadership by 
the Federal government.87 One development that has the potential to 
establish a more harmonised IAS regime is the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Biosecurity.88 The aim of the Agreement is to extend 
Australia’s existing biosecurity arrangements to the species that impact 
the economy, environment and community.89 While the Agreement has 
the potential to create an overarching strategy to prevent the 
introduction and establishment of invasive animals, plants and diseases, 
it does not tackle the problem of IAS that has already been 
established.90 
In 2002, the fragmented and inconsistent nature of Australia’s IAS 
regime prompted Senator Andrew Bartlett to introduce the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Invasive 
Species) Bill 2002 (“Invasive Species Bill”) into Federal Parliament as 
 
States afford a legislative base for listing of threatening processes. Western Australia, Northern 
Territory, South Australia, Tasmania, and Queensland, for example, do not accommodate official 
lists of Key Threatening Processes.  
 83. Sophie Riley, Law is Order, and Good Law is Good Order: the Role of Governance in 
the Regulation of Invasive Alien Species, 29 ENVTL. & PLAN. L. J. 16, 29 (2012).  
 84. See Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) § 301A 
(Austl.).  
 85. Id.  
 86. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Regulations, 228–301, 2000 
(Austl.).  
 87. See, e.g., Australian Parliament Senate Env’t, Commc’ns, Info. Tech. and the Arts 
References Comm., TURNING BACK THE TIDE: THE INVASIVE SPECIES CHALLENGE [REPORT ON 
THE REGULATION, CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF INVASIVE SPECIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AMENDMENT (INVASIVE SPECIES) BILL 2002 
(2004), available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=ecita_ctte/c
ompleted_inquiries/2004-07/invasive_species/report/report.pdf.  
 88. Council of Australian Gov’ts 
(COAG), Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity, COAG (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.coag.gov.au/node/47 (last visited Nov. 2012).  
 89. Id. at 3.  
 90. Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity, supra note 88.  
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a private member’s Bill.91 The Bill was designed to provide for better 
coordination of measures to deal with IAS.92 Amongst other things, it 
would have created a national database of invasive alien species93 and 
established an Invasive Species Advisory Committee.94 The 
composition of the Committee would have been widely drawn, 
providing a voice to non-government organizations, community groups 
and Indigenous peoples.95 As such, the Committee would have acted as 
a unifying institution by drawing together a diverse range of 
stakeholders to advise cabinet Ministers of the impacts of IAS.96 
The Bill was defeated in Federal Parliament, but triggered a senate 
inquiry, which was published as a report in 2004 entitled, Turning Back 
the Tide, the Invasive Species Challenge (the Senate Invasive Species 
Inquiry).97 The inquiry identified a range of shortcomings of the Bill, 
many of which centered on the imbalance that the Bill would have 
created with respect to governance mechanisms established under co-
operative Federalism.98 Indeed, several State and Territory governments 
voiced their concerns at the scope and breadth of powers that the 
Federal government would need to exercise in order to implement the 
provisions of the Bill.99 The senate was also of the view that the Bill 
was redundant, as it duplicated regulation established by the EPBC Act 
and also conflicted with regimes developed by the states and 
territories.100  The Senate concluded that: 
[t]he Bill’s single greatest strength is symbolic. It represents an 
attempt to codify in one piece of legislation a range of regulations 
currently scattered throughout the statute books which relate to the 
regulation, control and management of invasive species. This is a 
commendable, if somewhat idealistic, approach as there may be 
risks and confusion arising from . . . duplication . . . [in] . . . existing 
regulations . . . .
101 
 
 91. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Invasive Species) 
Bill, 2002 (Cth) (Austl.). 
 92. Id. at 19.  
 93. Id. at 7–11.  
 94. Id. at 30. The composition of the committee would have included representatives from 
AQIS, non-governmental conservation organizations, members of the scientific community, 
indigenous peoples, the commonwealth, the business community, and animal welfare groups. The 
role of the committee would have been to advise the Minister on protection of native biodiversity 
and agricultural commodities from IAS.  
 95. Id. at 23.  
 96. Id. at 30.  
 97. TURNING BACK THE TIDE, supra note 87, at xiii.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 200–02, 208.  
 100. Id. at 198.  
 101. Id. at 207.  
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This conclusion, which has not been revisited for almost a decade, 
contrasts sharply with developments in the US, where coordination of 
the IAS regime is now seen as a priority.  
 2.  The United States of America 
As already noted, the US has not ratified the CBD. Nevertheless, it 
has still introduced a considerable volume of regulation that is 
consistent with the principles of Article 8(h) of the CBD, which sets out 
obligations with respect to IAS.102 To start with, the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) undertakes border controls, and a 
program established within APHIS (the Plant Pest Program) is charged 
with “safeguarding agriculture and natural resources from entry, 
establishment, and spread of animal and plant pests and noxious 
weeds.”103 APHIS operates in accordance with the Plant Protection Act 
2000,104 and under delegated authority from the United States 
Department of Agriculture.105 Other legislation, such as the Aquatic 
Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990, targets invasive species 
of the aquatic environment.106 Elsewhere, the Lacey Act 1900107 and the 
Endangered Species Act 1973108 can be used by regulators to deal with 
IAS, although neither pieces of legislation are specifically designed to 
target these species. The Lacey Act 1900 can assist with controlling the 
transport of invasive species, while the Endangered Species Act 1973 
can be invoked to protect endangered species where they are threatened 
by IAS. 
In addition to legislation, the US Federal government has 
developed a number of policy instruments in the form of strategies and 
plans designed to eradicate and control IAS. These include the 2004 
National Strategy and Implementation Plan for Invasive Species 
Management, which stresses the need for collaboration and 
accountability in IAS regimes.109 
 
 102. See U.N.E.P., supra note 1, ¶ (i).  
 103. Plant Health, Usda-Aphis, (Nov. 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/plant_healthHealth.  
 104. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2000). See also History of APHIS, U.S. Dept. of 
Agric. Animal and Plant Health Inspection (last visited Aug. 7, 2013), 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/about_aphis/history.shtml (providing further information on the 
implementation of legislation).  
 105. Id. In addition, in September 2005, the USDA delegated authority to APHIS to 
implement the Noxious Weed Control and Eradication Act.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (1900).  
 108. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (1973).  
 109. U.S. Dept. of Agric., Forest Serv., Nat’l Strategy and Implementation Plan for Invasive 
Species Mgmt., Invasive Species, 3 (2004), available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/invasivespecies/documents/Final_National_Strategy_100804.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 2012).  
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Much regulation at the “grass roots” level is undertaken by the 
States and Territories; and has been studied in detail by the 
Environmental Law Institute (ELI).110 The ELI notes that many States 
deal with “pest” species by way of listing processes: either “white” lists 
to identify species that can be possessed and traded freely; or “black” 
lists to enumerate prohibited species.111 The white lists effectively ban 
the introduction of any species unless it is set out on the permitted list, 
while the black lists freely allow the introduction, possession or sale of 
species unless they have been explicitly deemed harmful and banned.112 
Most States in the US rely on black lists.113 Yet, one of the problems 
with black lists is that they identify those species that have already 
caused damage and can thus be classified as invasive. As such, black 
lists do not necessarily deal with the potential of species to become 
invasive. In addition, as has been noted in Australia, listing mechanisms 
in general are ineffective to prevent the internal trade in declared 
species.114 
Other than listing mechanisms, the United States has developed 
strategies and management plans to deal with IAS; these regularly 
highlight the need to coordinate activities and regimes. The Florida 
Exotic Pest Plant Council, for example, has developed management 
plans to deal with invasive species such as melaleucas, Brazilian pepper 
and Chinese tallow;115 while Louisiana has introduced a comprehensive 
plan to deal with aquatic IAS.116 The ELI has concluded that in many 
cases, states have developed such plans in response to the need for 
“cooperative regulation.”117 At the same time, the ELI has also noted 
that difficulties inherent in drawing together such a vast range of 
policies and measures have led to a system where:  
invasive species from different taxa and ecosystems [are regulated] 
in substantially different ways—aquatic species, wildlife, plants and 
 
 110. U.S. Dept. of Agric., Forest Serv., Nat’l Strategy and Implementation Plan for Invasive 
Species Mgmt., INVASIVE SPECIES, 3 (2004), available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/invasivespecies/documents/Final_National_Strategy_100804.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 2012).  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 17.  
  114. NATURAL RES. MGMT. MINISTERIAL COUNCIL, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
FISHERIES AND FORESTRY, A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF ORNAMENTAL 
FISH IN AUSTRALIA 8 (2006), available at 
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/288425/Management-of-ornamental-fish-
in-Australia.pdf.  
 115. See FLORIDA EXOTIC PEST PLANT COUNCIL, (last updated June 4, 2013), 
http://www.fleppc.org/publications.htmmanagement.  
 116. MARK MCELROY ET AL., STATE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR AQUATIC INVASIVE SPECIES 
IN LOUISIANA, LOUISIANA, DEP’T OF WILDLIFE AND FISHERIES (2005), available at 
http://is.cbr.tulane.edu/docs_IS/Louisiana-AIS-Mgt-Plan.pdf (last visited Nov. 2012).  
 117. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 9, at 16.  
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plant pests are regulated through entirely separate mechanisms by 
agencies that place different priorities on and use different strategies 
to address invasive species.
118
 
These were the types of challenges that prompted President 
Clinton to declare Executive Order 13112. As already noted, this order 
applies directly to Federal agencies and requires them to cooperate in 
preventing harm from IAS. The order also sets up the National Invasive 
Species Council (NISC) and the Invasive Species Advisory Committee 
(ISAC).119 The NISC provides guidance to Federal administrators and 
regulators on IAS regulation and also coordinates IAS measures across 
a range of “state, tribal and local” stakeholders.120 The ISAC is 
comprised of experts and other interested parties who are not affiliated 
with Federal departments or agencies. It meets at least twice a year and 
provides advice to the NISC. 121  
The catchphrase of the NISC is “Prepare, Prevent, Protect” and 
these ideals are reflected in the management plans that guide the 
operations of the NISC. The first plan, titled “Meeting the Invasive 
Species Challenge Management Plan,” was introduced in 2001 and 
acknowledged that the primary role of the NISC was to provide 
“national leadership and oversight” on invasive species.122 This 
objective is still important to the operation of the second management 
plan, the “2008-2012 National Invasive Species Management Plan” 
(2008 NISC Plan).123 
The 2008 NISC Plan is based on five strategic goals: Prevention; 
Early Detection and Rapid Response; Control and Management; 
Restoration; and Organizational Collaboration.124 The fifth goal, 
organizational collaboration, particularly targets coordination of 
activities by stressing the importance of maximizing “organizational 
effectiveness and collaboration on invasive species issues among 
international, Federal, state local and tribal governments, private 
organizations and individuals.”125  
Given the fact that Executive Order 13112 does not endow the 
NISC with legal authority to compel agencies to take particular action, 
 
 118. Id. at 15.  
 119. Executive Order No 13112, supra note 49, at §§ 3(a)–(b).  
 120. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, MEETING THE INVASIVE SPECIES CHALLENGE, 
MANAGEMENT PLAN 4 (2001).  
 121. The Charter of the U.S. Department of the Interior Invasive Species Advisory 
Committee, available at 
http://www.invasivespecies.gov/global/ISAC/ISAC_documents/ISAC_Charter_2010.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 2012).  
 122. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 120, at 3.  
 123. Id. at 28.  
 124. Id. at 5–6.  
 125. Id. at 28.  
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or to re-organize departments, its remit is ambitious.126 The concept of 
coordination, for example, which is inherent in the notion of 
organizational collaboration, not only includes coordination of activities 
between the Federal government and other levels of government, but 
also includes coordination of activities amongst Federal agencies and 
departments themselves. In accordance with the 2008 NISC Plan, these 
activities are to be evaluated against eighty-seven performance targets, 
involving some thirty-five departments and agencies.127 
An important aspect of the NISC’s leadership flows from its ability 
to conduct evaluations across Federal departments and agencies. In this 
regard, the NISC management plan “not only serves as a framework for 
overall priorities, but also sets ballpark performance indicators for 
evaluating success.”128 As part of the evaluation process, the NISC also 
collects budget information on agency spending related to invasive 
species. This allows continuous overview of the Federal government’s 
operations in a strategic way.129 
A further initiative is the special category of funding proffered by 
the Federal government for research into IAS, administered under the 
auspices of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). These 
grants provide a starting point for stakeholders researching IAS to apply 
for funding.130 One successful example of the funding process is drawn 
from the design of management plans for the control of aquatic IAS. In 
addition to the regulation of aquatic IAS, a number of states have used 
the same plans as a platform from which to evaluate their terrestrial 
IAS.131 In these cases, the funding has become value-added, as the 
projects promote appraisal of IAS regulation that extends beyond the 
initial scope of the funds. While these developments are positive, the 
funding process has nevertheless received its share of criticism. The 
ELI, for example, notes that the funding streams operate inconsistently 
and do not support state IAS regimes in as effective a manner as 
possible.132 
The most striking feature of the operation of the NISC is the 
 
 126. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL (NISC), FIVE-YEAR REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE 
ORDER 13112 ON INVASIVE SPECIES 10 (2005), available at 
http://www.invasivespecies.gov/home_documents/Five-Year%20Review-
FINAL%20PRINT%20VERSION.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL 
(NISC)].  
 127. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 120, at 5.  
 128. Discussion with Stanley Burgiel, NISC, in Wash., D.C. (Oct. 2010).  
 129. Id.  
 130. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., GRANT AND PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS THAT CAN 
ADDRESS INVASIVE SPECIES RESEARCH, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, PREVENTION AND CONTROL-
FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR 2012 2, 17 (2011).  
 131. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 9, at 10.  
 132. Id. at 9–10.  
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importance that the Federal government attaches to the coordination of 
IAS-related activities. Against this backdrop, leadership by Federal 
authorities is the crucial linchpin. Accordingly, the NISC draws on its 
strengths, which includes the ability to offer a high-level forum for 
stakeholders to exchange information, and to discuss and settle mutually 
beneficial goals and objectives.133 Meetings of the NISC have thus 
played an important role in shaping uniform policy for the regulation of 
IAS. Indeed, dialogue and consultation are seen as so vital that, 
although the NISC’s principal goal is coordination across Federal 
agencies, collaboration with other entities is an important, if secondary, 
function. Thus, beyond domestic regulation, the NISC sponsored 
regional workshops that included participants such as the Global 
Invasive Species Program (GISP).134 Although the GISP was closed at 
the end of March 2011, such cooperation is still regarded as 
important.135 Such cooperation is regarded as important to building 
knowledge and sharing techniques and technology for stopping the 
introduction and spread of IAS, especially among regional trading 
partners.  
Another significant achievement of the NISC has been the 
establishment of an online information portal, the National Invasive 
Species Information Centre, which the NISC has achieved with the 
assistance of the United States Department of Agriculture and the 
National Agricultural Library.136 The portal links online information 
and the websites of government departments and agencies as well as 
non-government groups.137 As such, it facilitates dialogue on IAS across 
a range of government and non-government agencies. For example, it 
allows regulators, researchers and community groups to determine 
whether they are working towards the same goals and objectives and 
also facilitates scrutiny of regulatory processes for consistency and 
acceptance by stakeholders. In so doing, the NISC has become a hub for 
the dissemination of information as well as for encouraging the 
development of harmonised regulatory objectives for IAS. 
This is not to say that the NISC has been a panacea for meeting the 
IAS challenge in the US. The activities and effectiveness of the NISC 
 
 133. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL (NISC), supra note 126, at 9, 10.  
 134. Id. at 2, 14. GISP was the Global Invasive Species Programme. It was an international 
organization that was formed in 1997 to develop best practices to control IAS on a global scale. 
The institution closed on 31 March 2011. See Closure of the Global Invasive Species Programme 
(GISP), BOTANIC GARDENS CONSERVATION INT’L (last visited Mar. 2011), 
http://www.bgci.org/resources/news/0794.  
 135. Id.  
 136. See NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES INFO. CTR. (NISIC), http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov 
(last visited Nov. 2012).  
 137. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL (NISC), supra note 126, at 2.  
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are regularly reviewed138 and a 2003 review indicated that the NISC had 
only met a small proportion of its goals.139 Yet this conclusion still 
needs to be understood in context. In particular, before the 
establishment of the NISC, the US lacked an overarching coordination 
mechanism for the regulation of IAS. As already noted, the NISC was 
charged with an ambitious remit and the achievement of a large number 
of goals and objectives. This meant that the NISC had much ground to 
cover, especially in its early years. Moreover, the NISC operates within 
the confines of the constitutional powers of the Federal government. 
Accordingly, the NISC does not exercise legal authority across the 
board. Indeed, notwithstanding these challenges, as the Five-Year 
Review of Executive Order 13112 on Invasive Species notes, the NISC 
has chalked up an impressive track record.140 In an analogous manner, 
the collaborative approaches of the NISC and its emphasis on 
coordination of activities are also acknowledged as important in 
jurisdictions such as GB.  
 3.  Great Britain 
As with Australia and the US, the IAS regime in GB consists of a 
mix of border controls and internal regulation. Again, with similarity to 
Australia and the US, the latter includes a combination of policy and 
legislative instruments. 
Border Controls in GB are maintained by the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), and are shaped by EU 
directives aimed at preventing the introduction and spread of pests and 
diseases. By way of example, EC Plant Health Directive 
(2000/29/EC)141 has been implemented in GB by means of Secondary 
legislation, including the Plant Health (England) Order 2005, the Plant 
Health (Wales) Order 2006, and the Plant Health (Scotland) Order 
2005.142 Other legislation prohibits the importation of “non-indigenous 
mammalian species” with destructive habits.143 Permanent Orders have 
been made banning some species such as musk rats, grey squirrels, and 
 
 138. See, e.g., Federal Efforts and State Perspectives on Challenges and National 
Leadership, U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF. (June 2003),  available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03916t.pdf (last visited Nov. 2012); NATIONAL INVASIVE 
SPECIES COUNCIL (NISC), supra note 126, at 13.  
 139. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 138, at 2.  
 140. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL (NISC), supra note 126, at 2.  
 141. Council Directive 2000/29 (EC), Protective Measures Against the Introduction into the 
Community of Organisms Harmful to Plants or Plant Products and Against their Spread within 
the Community, 2000 O.J. (L 169) 1.  
 142. See HELEN LONG ET AL., GUIDELINES ON LEGISLATION, IMPORT, PRACTICES AND 
QUARANTINE FOR BOTANIC GARDENS AND KINDRED INSTITUTIONS 4 (Judith Cheney ed., 2006).  
 143. Destructive Imported Animals Act, 1932, 22 Geo. 5, c. 12, §10 (Eng.).  
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non-indigenous rabbits.144 
Apart from border controls, for many years, section 14 of the 
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 was the main legislative instrument 
dealing with IAS in GB.145 The section initially created offences with 
respect to keeping or releasing prohibited species listed in schedule 9 of 
the Act, otherwise known as the “Keeling Schedule.” Offences 
included: allowing listed animals which were not ordinarily resident in, 
or a regular visitor to GB, to escape into the wild; releasing these 
animals into the wild; allowing such animals to escape from captivity; 
and, planting or causing a listed plant to grow in the wild.146 Regulation 
was thus based on a “black list” approach, which is similar to the 
systems established in Australia and the US.  
Over the years, section 14 was amended on an ad hoc basis, either 
to comply with European Union directives, or to fulfil recommendations 
following internal reviews of non-native species. For example, the 
section was amended to give effect to the Wild Birds Directive147 and 
the Habitats Directive,148 which require members to prevent and control 
the introduction of invasive non-native species. The Wildlife and 
Countryside Act 1981 was further amended in 2004 following a review 
of non-native species policy in 2001.149  
By the beginning of the 21st century the focus of regulation had 
begun to shift towards governance issues. In 2006, for example, 
DEFRA commissioned an audit into governance structures for non-
native species.150 The audit concluded that 101 “business units” were 
charged with responsibilities relating to non-native species.151 In some 
cases, business units comprised entire departments, while in other cases 
 
 144. Musk Rats Act 1933 (S.I. No. 199/1965) (Ir.); Grey Squirrels (Prohibition of 
Importation and Keeping) Order, 1937, SI 1937/478 (N. Ir. 478), art. 1; The Non-Indigenous 
Rabbits (Prohibition of Importation and Keeping) Order, 1954, SI 1954/927 (N. Ir. 927), art. 2.   
 145. The Wildlife & Countryside Act 1981, WILD BIRDS AND THE LAW, 
http://www.rspb.org.uk/ourwork/policy/wildbirdslaw/birdsandlaw/wca/ (last visited Apr. 13, 
2013). Section 14 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 created offences if a person released 
an animal or allowed it to escape in circumstances where the animal “is not an ordinarily resident 
in and is not a regular visitor to Great Britain in a wild state.” See Wildlife and Countryside Act, 
1981, c. 69, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/69/contents.  
 146. Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981, c. 69, §§ 14 (1)(A), (14), (2).  
 147. Council Directive 79/409 (EC), Conservation of Wild Birds, Directive 1979 O.J. (L. 
103) 1.  
 148. Council Directive 92/43 (EC), Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, 1992 O.J. (L 206).  
 149. The amending regulations were: The Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (England and 
Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2004, and the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 
(Amendment) (Wales) Regulations 2004. For a short discussion, see Matthew Fasham and Kate 
Trumper, Review of Non-Native Species Legislation and Guidance, DEFRA (2001), available at 
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/wildlife-pets/wildlife/management/non-native/documents/review-
report.pdf (last visited Nov. 2012).  
 150. NON-NATIVE SPECIES FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 6.  
 151. Id.  
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they comprised portions of departments or executive agencies.152 The 
audit concluded that the IAS regime in GB needed “greater strategic 
cohesion and a clearer sense of common goals.”153 This finding was 
consistent with a policy review in 2003 that recommended that “[t]he 
Government should designate or create a single lead co-ordinating 
organisation to undertake the role of co-ordinating and ensuring 
consistency of application of non-native species policies across 
Government.”154 A peak body was thus seen as vital to drawing together 
the various components of the IAS regime.  
The synthesised conclusions and recommendations from these 
instruments were integrated into the Invasive Non-Native Species 
Framework Strategy for Great Britain (GB Non-Native Species 
Strategy).155 This Strategy emphasized the need for effective 
coordination of policy and measures across the entire IAS regime, and 
in particular for the establishment of a coherent and proportionate 
legislative framework.156 In furtherance of this objective, the 
government established the GB Non-native Species Coordination 
Mechanism, which strengthens initiatives established prior to the release 
of the 2008 GB Non-Native Species Strategy and also introduces a 
number of new initiatives.157 The Coordination Mechanism itself 
consists of the Non-Native Species Programme Board, the Non-Native 
Species Secretariat (NNSS), the Risk Analysis Panel, the Stakeholder 
Forum and a number of Working Groups.158 
The Non-Native Species Programme Board159 was established in 
2005 and comprises senior representatives of government agencies from 
England, Scotland, and Wales. The role of the Programme Board 
includes the development and implementation of the GB Non-Native 
Species Strategy and the determination of priorities for IAS regulation. 
The Programme Board also runs the annual Stakeholder Forum, which 
provides an opportunity for discussion, debate and awareness of 
emerging IAS issues.160 The Non-Native Species Secretariat was 
established in 2006 to support the Programme Board; and additionally, 
provides an avenue for communication between the Board and 
 
 152. Id. at 6.  
 153. Id.at 21–22.  
 154. Id. at 32.  
 155. DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, THE INVASIVE NON-NATIVE SPECIES 
FRAMEWORK STRATEGY FOR GREAT BRITAIN 34 (2008).  
 156. Id. at 24.  
 157. GB NON-NATIVE SPECIES COORDINATION MECHANISM, 
https://secure.fera.defra.gov.uk/nonnativespecies/home/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 2012).  
 158. Id.  
 159. NON-NATIVE SPECIES FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 34.  
 160. Id. at 35.  
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stakeholders.161 The Non-Native Species Risk Analysis Panel will 
undertake risk assessment and “horizon scanning” with respect to the 
introduction of alien species.162 The reports of the Non-Native Species 
Risk Analysis Panel will guide the operation of the Programme Board. 
In tandem with these initiatives, the Scottish government also 
embarked on a program to update its IAS regulation. Prior to 2011, IAS 
in Scotland were largely governed by the Wildlife and Countryside Act 
1981 that applied throughout GB. Following devolution of legislative 
authority over Scotland in 1998, however, the Scottish government 
began introducing more targeted IAS regulation, including: the Nature 
Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004;163 and the Salmon and Freshwater 
Fisheries (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 2003. 164  
The most far-reaching changes, however, stem from the passing of 
the Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland) Act 2011 that 
extensively amended the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 as it 
applied in Scotland. The explanatory memorandum to the Wildlife and 
Natural Environment (Scotland) Bill (SP Bill 52) (EM) notes that laws 
to regulate the keeping of all “potential high-risk invasive animals and 
plants” were not reflected in Scotland’s IAS regime. 165 Proposed 
measures, however, would need to be proportionate to risks. Hence, 
banning all known invasive species would be disproportionate if the 
risks they pose are minor.166  
Significantly, the EM notes that basing legislation on “black lists” 
of declared or prohibited species, as occurred under the Keeling 
Schedule of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, is 
counterproductive because such species will generally be listed once 
they have proved to be invasive.167 Accordingly, the legislation is based 
on a “general no-release approach” intended to operate as a preventative 
mechanism to stop people from releasing or growing “potentially 
 
 161. Id. at 34.  
 162. For example, Schedule 6 of the Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004 and section 50 
of the Natural Environment and Rural Communities NERC Act 2006 amend the Wildlife and 
Countryside Act 1981 to enhance environmental protection from non-native species; FOOD AND 
RURAL AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 34; Non-Native Risk Analysis Panel, NON-NATIVE SPECIES 
SECRETARIAT (Nov. 2012), 
https://secure.fera.defra.gov.uk/nonnativespecies/index.cfm?pageid=51 (last visited Nov. 2012).  
 163. Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, section 11, amended, among other things, 
section 14 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 by introducing a new definition of non-
native. Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act, 2004, (A.S.P. 6), 69, 14.  
 164. Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 2003, (A.S.P. 15), 
which came into force in 2008, introduced § 33, which makes it an offence to introduce live fish 
or spawn, intentionally into inland waters, without a permit.  
 165. Policy Memorandum (Scotland), Wildlife and Natural Environment, SP Bill 52, part 2 
(Donnelly 2010) [hereinafter Policy Memorandum].  
 166. Id. ¶ 106.  
 167. Id. ¶ 103.  
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harmful animals or plants’ plants” that could become established in the 
wild.168  
Notwithstanding this policy objective, authorities have power in 
accordance with Section 14(1) of the Wildlife and Natural Environment 
(Scotland) Act 2011 to create lists of prohibited species where the 
threats the species pose are not minor.169 As the EM notes, however, the 
legislation is intended to operate without a detailed list of banned 
species; and banning orders will only be used where crucial, and even 
then, only after consultation with stakeholders.170 Where banning orders 
have been made, the legislation prohibits those species from being sold 
or offered for sale.171 The Minister can also exempt species through 
legislation, and exemptions have been made for pheasants and 
partridges that are released for game hunting.172  
To support the no-release policy, the legislation creates a range of 
offences including: allowing an animal to escape from captivity beyond 
its native range,173 and planting or causing a plant to grow in the wild 
beyond its native range.174 The notion of a “native range” refers to the 
locality to which the animal or plant is indigenous.175 As such, it 
excludes localities where the animal or plant has been introduced. 
Moreover, the term does not automatically refer to an entire political or 
administrative unit, such as the whole of Scotland. Accordingly, the 
drafters of the legislation evince regulatory acknowledgement that a 
“native” species can be just as destructive as an alien species if it is 
introduced outside its native range.  
In accordance with section 14C of the Wildlife and Natural 
Environment (Scotland) Act 2011, the Minister may settle on a code of 
practice that provides practical guidance with respect to activities that 
would otherwise be deemed an offence. This allows a person adhering 
to the code to take advantage of specified defences.176 For example, 
some animals such as falcons and other raptors may be released 
temporarily and the codes could provide guidance on how such species 
 
 168. Id. ¶¶ 69, 79, 86, 105.  
 169. Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland), 2011, (A.S.P. 6). §§ 14(1)(a)(ii), 
14(2)(b)(1).  
 170. Policy Memorandum 52, supra note 165, ¶ 86.  
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 175. Id.  
 176. These relate to the following sections of the Wildlife and Natural Environment 
(Scotland) Act 2011: § 14 (release of non-native species), § 14C (offences for banned species), § 
14A (prohibition on sale and other dealings of invasive species) and § 14B (notification of the 
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still remain under control for the purposes of the legislation.177 
Finally, the Scottish Minister may notify persons, such as property 
managers, and those in a professional capacity of the presence of 
invasive plants and animals.178 These notifications channel into rapid 
response mechanisms designed to prevent IAS from escalating from a 
comparatively small problem into a more widespread one. To this 
effect, s14D states that “relevant bodies” may make a species control 
order with respect to invasive plants and animals.179   A “relevant body” 
includes Scottish Ministers, the Scottish Natural Heritage, the Scottish 
Environment Protection Agency and the Forestry Commission.180   
The Scottish legislature has thus placed its IAS regulation under 
the umbrella of a robust and unifying statute. If successful, there is 
potential for identical or similar legislation to be introduced in other 
jurisdictions in GB. This uniform approach to IAS regulation, however, 
is not the norm elsewhere. For example, in Australia and the US, the 
quality and effectiveness of IAS measures, and ultimately the regime 
itself, varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Even regulation within the 
same level of government is plagued by gaps, inconsistencies and areas 
of overlap. The key issue for the purposes of this paper is whether peak 
coordinating bodies are a feasible means of drawing together many 
components to create a “whole” IAS regime that is greater than the sum 
of its individual laws and regulations.  
IV. THE WHOLE VS. THE SUM OF ITS PARTS 
The US and GB have sought to effect coordination by establishing 
peak institutions consisting respectively of the National Invasive 
Species Council and the Non-Native Species Secretariat. Although these 
bodies are established in differing political and legal systems, the NISC 
and NNSS share similarities stemming from the role they play and the 
tacit understanding that their operation will lead to transformation and 
improved regulation. 
Each body is designed to provide guidance and leadership, but not 
to have wide-ranging legal powers to impose homogenous regulations 
on the spectrum of agencies, departments and jurisdictions across the 
different levels of government.181 Accordingly, the backbone of these 
 
 177. Policy Memorandum, supra note 165, ¶ 81. At the time of writing, the government had 
released a code of practice detailing how the legislation in general is to operate. See Non-Native 
Species Code of Practice (2012), available at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/08/7367/0 (made by the Scottish Ministers under 
Section 14C of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981).  
 178. Policy Memorandum, supra note 165, at § 14C.  
 179. Wildlife and Natural Environment Act, supra note 169, §14D.  
 180. Id. at § 14P(6).  
 181. See generally THE NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, 
http://www.invasivespecies.gov/main_nav/mn_about.html (last visited. Mar. 15, 2013).  
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bodies lies in their ability to draw the IAS regime together by 
coordinating the diverse responses to IAS. Common coordinating 
mechanisms include: the promotion of unified policy-making; the use of 
broad-based advisory bodies; the use of an overarching definition of an 
IAS; and the provision of services such as a one-stop information portal. 
1.  Unified Policy 
Policy may be described as “a set of principles and intentions used 
to guide decision making.”182 As with other areas of regulation, it is an 
important tool for formulating effective environmental regimes because 
it draws together social, economic, environmental and scientific 
considerations.183 In the context of IAS, policy shapes how regulators 
set the parameters of regulation by determining which species are 
subject to measures, as well as how regulators determine optimal 
governance arrangements. The latter are particularly crucial where 
regulation is spread across a multiplicity of sectors, compelling 
regulators to make value-based decisions on how to deal with 
competing interests.  
The policy approaches of Australia, the UK and the USA are found 
in a range of agreements, orders, statements, action plans and strategies 
that all acknowledge the importance of coordination to the success of 
IAS regimes. In Australia, for example, principle 6 of the Australian 
Pest Animal Strategy—A National Strategy for the Management of 
Vertebrate Pest Animals in Australia notes that “[p]est animal 
management requires coordination among all levels of government in 
partnership with industry, land and water managers and the community, 
regardless of land tenure.”184 Similar policy statements in GB185 and the 
US186 also stress the need for collaboration, communication, and 
“procedural streamlining.”187 
Notwithstanding general consensus for a coordinated response to 
IAS regulation, the Australian regime still remains fragmented, 
incomplete and lacking in effective leadership. In the Senate Invasive 
 
 182. JANE ROBERTS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 2 (1st ed. 2010).  
 183. Id. at 2–3.  
 184. NRMMC, supra note 75; see also Natural Heritage Trust, Australian Emergency Marine 
Pest Plan EMPPlan: Control Centres Management Manual, NAT. HERITAGE TRUST (2005), 
available at 
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Emergency Management Framework For Marine Bio-Invasions, 19 AUSTL. J. OF EMERGENCY 
MGMT. 50 (2004).  
 185. FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 8.  
 186. See generally Exec. Order No. 13112, supra note 49 (establishing the Invasive Species 
Council); see also, NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 120, at 5.  
 187. See NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 120, at ii.  
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Species Inquiry, the Australian Senate noted that the Federal 
government needed to “strengthen its leadership role in the national 
effort to combat invasive species by developing a robust national 
framework, in consultation with State, Territory and local governments, 
to regulate, control and manage invasive species”188 
The need for greater Federal leadership was also stressed 
elsewhere in the report.189 Yet, one of the perceived drawbacks of the 
IAS Bill is that it was predicated on strengthened Federal legislative 
powers;190 and as already noted, the Senate was concerned at the 
potential for this to destabilize the balance of power in Australia’s 
system of government.191  
The use of legislation to impose uniform or coordinated regulation, 
however, is just one way of drawing the IAS regime together. Shine, 
Williams, and Gündling have identified three models for coordinating 
IAS regimes, and only the first model depends on centralised and robust 
legal processes that can override State and Territory jurisdictions.192 
This model, described as a “unitary legislative framework,” stands in 
contrast to the second and third models that involve decreasing degrees 
of central control.193 The second model, for example, consists of 
establishing a coordinating body with authority to harmonise aims, 
methods and processes, but with a lesser concentration of power than 
the first model.194 The third option comprises a coordinating body that 
does not have legal authority to impose uniform or harmonised IAS 
measures.195 Instead, that body largely functions on political 
persuasion.196 At the same time, the second and third models are still 
reliant on a central government taking a leadership role.197  
The NISC, for example, appears to be based on the third model.198 
Although it has power to direct Federal agencies, it does not have 
authority to overrule State and territory agencies.199 In the latter, its role 
is to guide regimes using soft techniques.200 Accordingly, the NISC 
neither dismantles institutions already established by the states and 
territories, nor encroaches on state and territory jurisdiction.201 Instead, 
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the NISC exerts its influence by acting as a coordinating role-model.202 
Indeed, fostering a unified policy-base is one of the key features of peak 
bodies and in the US, the NISC has been able to consider the “big 
picture” and identify “trends in invasions” influencing state regimes.203  
2.  Advisory Panels and Committees 
In the US, the Invasive Species Advisory Committee (ISAC) is 
constituted as an advisory body to assist the NISC.204 In accordance 
with its charter, membership of the ISAC is widely drawn and includes 
educators, biologists, lawyers, representatives from industry, tribal 
representatives, economists and representatives from non-government 
organisations.205 This range provides the ISAC with considerable 
expertise, allowing the views of the Committee to be representative in 
the broadest possible sense. To encourage stakeholder engagement, 
meetings of ISAC are open to the public and the minutes of meetings 
are also available for public scrutiny.206 Advisory bodies, however, are 
not fool proof. Their membership needs to be truly representative to 
avoid accusations of bias.207 Nevertheless, if properly constituted, they 
do provide opportunities for public input and discussion that enhances 
the effectiveness of regulation.208  
Neither Australia nor the UK has a comparable advisory body, 
although each has committees and panels that act in an advice-giving 
capacity with respect to parts of the IAS problem. In Australia, for 
example, the Threatened Species Scientific Committee (TSSC),209 is 
constituted in accordance with the EPBC Act and provides advice on 
the listing of threatening processes, including the impacts of IAS, as 
well as advising with respect to the adoption of threat abatement plans. 
In the case of weeds, the Australian Weeds Committee (AWC) was 
established as a governmental forum to resolve weeds issues.210 Neither 
the TSSC, nor the AWC, however, are as widely representative as the 
ISAC,—either in terms of composition of committee members or in 
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their sphere of activity.211 This is not surprising as neither committee 
was designed to deal with IAS at large, nor intended as a forum for 
engaging with the public and other stakeholders.  
Although the UK has not established a comparable body to the 
ISAC, it has initiated the GB Non-native Species Coordination 
Mechanism, which, as already discussed, includes a secretariat, the 
Non-Native Species Programme Board and the Stakeholder Forum. 
Recall that the Programme Board directs the secretariat, while the 
Stakeholder Forum engages with government, industry and the 
community. Combined, these two panels perform a similar function to 
the ISAC, especially with respect to oversight of country-wide 
coordination mechanisms that encourage stakeholder input.   
Two features set the US and UK regimes apart from the Australian 
one. First, the US and UK processes cover the range of IAS, while the 
Australian system is fragmented and piece-meal with insufficient 
unifying elements. Undoubtedly, the committees established in 
Australia do a great deal of good work within their own disciplines. 
They, however, are not coordinating bodies because they do not bring 
the regime together in a cohesive manner. No agency, for example, sees 
the “big picture.” Second, the Australian system lacks comprehensive 
means for engaging stakeholders at the Federal level. This is at least 
partly due to the absence of advisory and consultative panels with 
widely-drawn membership that would otherwise provide a forum for 
open discussion and community consultation. A further and related 
drawback of the Australian regime is the lack of uniform terminology, 
which makes it difficult for stakeholders to be clear about primary goals 
and objectives. 
3.  Uniform Definition  
Adopting a uniform definition of an IAS is perhaps one of the most 
significant features of coordinating mechanisms. Governments are often 
faced with competing views and values that determine whether species 
should be treated as IAS. This situation can be particularly problematic 
in formulating policy and regulation where one person’s IAS is 
 
 211. In accordance with §§ 502 and 503 of the EPBC Act, the Minister determines the 
qualifications and appoints the members of the Threatened Species Scientific Committee. The 
members have traditionally been drawn from a science background. Membership of the 
Australian Weeds Committee is drawn from government departments, including the Department 
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry as well as the Department of Sustainability, Environment, 
Water, Population and Communities. Other agencies, such as Plant Health Australia, have been 
granted observer status. See Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and 
Communities, Roles and Responsibilities (Austl.), available at 
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/invasive/weeds/government/roles/index.html. 
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another’s resource.212 Definitions are thus crucial in guiding the 
operations of regimes by setting parameters and triggers for regulation. 
In the US, the Executive Order on IAS defines an IAS as a species 
that is not native to an ecosystem and whose “introduction does or is 
likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm to human 
health.”213 This definition adopts an ecosystem approach to regulation 
and contrasts with implementation of regimes that often correspond to 
local government, territory or state boundaries. Using ecosystem 
parameters is important because it brings the fact that administrative 
boundaries rarely coincide with ecological ones to the forefront, and 
allows regulation to be formulated accordingly.214 
 In a similar manner, the GB Framework defines a “non-native 
species” (NNS) as “the equivalent of ‘Alien species’ as used by the 
Convention on Biological Diversity.”215 Within the CBD, the Guiding 
Principles for the Prevention, Introduction and Mitigation of Impacts of 
Alien Species that Threaten Ecosystems, Habitats or Species (CBD 
Guiding Principles) define an alien species as one that has been 
introduced outside its natural past or present distribution.216 Invasive 
non-native species, which are the equivalent of IAS, are broadly defined  
as species whose “introduction and/or spread threaten biological 
diversity or have other unforseen impacts.”217 Although the CBD and 
GB Framework each use different phrases, the salient point when 
defining an IAS and an NNS is that both focus on ecological rather than 
administrative parameters. Accordingly, a species moved from one part 
of a country to another is not automatically classified as a native 
species. A similar policy approach has been taken in Scotland, where, as 
already discussed, the Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland) Act 
2011 Act defines native species in terms of their indigenous range.218  
By way of contrast, Australia does not enjoy the benefit of an 
ecologically-based definition of an IAS.219 The EPBC Act, the main 
legislation regulating the protection of biodiversity at the Federal level, 
defines a “native species” as one that was present in Australia, or an 
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external Territory, before 1400.220 This temporal definition that 
nominates a cut-off date is useful for administrative purposes, but lacks 
the functional competence of ecologically-based definitions. In 
particular, it does not evince recognition that a native species can 
become invasive if introduced beyond its native range. 
The one attempt at introducing a uniform definition for IAS in 
Australia pursuant to the Invasive Species Bill 2002 was 
unsuccessful.221 Similar to other provisions of the Bill, the Senate 
Invasive Species Inquiry considered an overarching definition 
unnecessary, as it would duplicate existing processes.222 Yet Australia 
does not enjoy the benefit of a prime definition for an IAS. At the same 
time, jurisdictions in the US, GB and Scotland demonstrate that there 
are many ways of integrating such definitions into IAS practice. It is 
significant, for example, that the definition found in section 14P of the 
Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland) Act 2011 applies to one 
political unit, namely Scotland.223 By way of contrast, the national 
definitions found in the US and GB apply co-extensively to many 
different levels of government. Accordingly, these national definitions 
do not operate from a legislative base, which could otherwise 
potentially override or invalidate regulation found in those other 
jurisdictions. In this way, the US and GB approaches do not trespass 
against constitutional balances of power. Rather, they comprise part of a 
suite of coordination mechanisms that include other initiatives, such as 
the creation of information portals. 
4.  Information Portals 
The establishment of one-stop information portals, accessible via 
the Internet, is a key feature of the IAS regimes in the US and GB. In 
GB, the GB Non-native Species Coordination Mechanism is in the 
process of establishing the “Non-Native Species Information Portal”;224 
while in the US, the National Invasive Species Council was 
instrumental in launching the National Invasive Species Information 
Centre (NISIC) in 2005.225 The Information Centre operates under the 
auspices of the National Agricultural Library, although the NISIC 
creates and manages the online information.226 
 
 220. Id.  
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Information portals serve as gateways for holding data and making 
it available to stakeholders in a readily accessible manner. As The 
National Biodiversity Network in GB has noted:  
[A]lthough a huge amount of information exists, it isn’t always easy 
to access. The National Biodiversity Network (NBN) idea could not 
be simpler: capture wildlife data once in a standard electronic form; 
integrate data from different sources; and use the internet to enable 




Given that one of the strengths of peak bodies lies in their strategic 
approach to regulation, it is important that they be able to access and 
share data as effectively as possible. The NISIC, for example, acts as a 
gateway, linking information and data at the individual, local, regional, 
national and international levels. The Non-Native Species Information 
Portal in GB is being established with similar expectations.228  
Australia lacks a comparable information portal. Currently, 
information on IAS is gathered and held by numerous agencies and 
organizations, which provide information gateways for specific IAS 
such as weeds229 or feral animals.230 This information, however, is 
located at separate electronic sites and lacks the cohesiveness of a one-
stop portal. Non-government organisations (NGOs), such as the 
Invasive Species Council, have also established websites to provide 
information and up-to-date material.231  Yet, it is unrealistic to expect 
NGOs to fund the construction and upkeep of dedicated information 
portals for an entire regime and for the whole country. Arguably, the 
lack of dedicated information systems in Australia flows from the 
absence of a peak body to oversee the regime. For example, it is no 
coincidence that information portals in the US and GB were, or are, 
being established under the auspices of PCBs. While this is one positive 
argument in favor of peak bodies, a further consideration is whether 
peak bodies are the most appropriate way to coordinate the regulation of 
IAS. 
5.  Are Peak Bodies the “Best” Model? 
To address this question, at least three matters need to be 
considered: first, whether peak bodies in general are the most effective 
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way to “solve” coordination problems; second, whether peak bodies are 
the best way of engaging with stakeholders; and third, whether peak 
bodies disrupt Federal-state and/or constitutional arrangements. 
From the discussion thus far, it is clear that one of the major 
challenges to designing and implementing effective IAS regimes stems 
from the need to adopt coordinated, if not uniform, approaches to IAS. 
Where measures are designed and implemented across multiple layers 
and levels of government, regulation in one jurisdiction will often be 
ineffective without cooperation and collaboration by other jurisdictions. 
 In the US, for example, the Environmental Law Institute has 
concluded that: 
each state government has evolved a unique complex web of 
authorities to enable it to address different types of invasive species 
and different invasion pathways. . . . [F]ew states address all 
pathways and because invasive species reproduce, spread and are 
often moved by people, each state is hindered or helped by the 
quality of neighbouring states’ laws.  As a result, state and local 




Even within the same level of government, the need for 
coordinated efforts is underscored by the myriad of laws, departments 
and agencies that touch upon IAS regulation. Again, in the US, the 
NISC has noted that with respect to Federal laws: 
[I]nvasive species coordination is complex and dynamic, 
encompassing 25 Federal laws that address invasive species issues, 
which govern the activities of over 40 agencies and many more 
programs. In addition, NISC staff members estimate about 300 non-
Federal programs, 175 organizations, and 140 groups have at least 
some involvement with invasive species issues.
233
 
In 2003, a review of non-native species policy in GB reached 
similar conclusions, noting that the parts of the IAS regime that were 
the “most developed” were those that affected economic interests.234 
One of the challenges stemmed from the fact that IAS regulation 
inherently cuts across many policy interests. At present, the 
executive responsibilities for non–native species issues are devolved 
and administrative responsibilities are also spread across different 
Government Departments and Agencies in each part of Great 
Britain. There is a variety of statutory powers under different 
legislation and also non-statutory measures in place to address 
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invasive non-native species problems.
235
 
Part of the reason for this assortment of fragmentary and 
overlapping regulation was identified as the lack of a “single 
Government contact point or lead co-ordinating organisation.”236 
Accordingly, the review recommended the establishment of a peak body 
to provide leadership in coordinating the GB regime.237  
Similar conclusions can be reached with respect to the Australian 
regime and the need for more harmonised efforts.238 Indeed, the Senate 
Invasive Species Inquiry recommended that: 
the Commonwealth Government strengthen its leadership role in the 
national effort to combat invasive species by developing a robust 
national framework, in consultation with State, Territory and local 
governments, to regulate, control and manage invasive species.
239  
Unlike the review of non-native species policy in GB, the senate 
report stopped short of recommending the establishment of a peak 
regulatory body; however, it did set out the key features for a proposed 
national framework. These include: a national policy that determines 
aims, targets and focus; common definitions; “harmonised state and 
territory legislation consistent with the national statutory framework”; 
and a national information portal to assist with “strategic planning.”240 
One issue that the Senate did not address was how these objectives 
could be achieved in the absence of a unifying instrumentality.  
It is theoretically possible that without the guidance of a 
centralised body, the states and territories could collaborate amongst 
themselves to establish a harmonised IAS regime. In some respects, this 
has already been partially achieved with respect to initiatives such as the 
Weeds of National Significance Program.241 This type of program, 
however, does not cover the full range of IAS. Moreover, as the review 
of non-native species policy in GB pointed out, while it is possible to 
boost dialogue and linkages among government departments, this may 
not be a sufficiently effective coordination pathway.242 In particular, 
where authorities must grapple with decades of ad hoc regulation, it is 
almost impossible to achieve an effective regime unless measures are 
underpinned by coordination and prioritization of aims and 
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objectives.243  
It is also significant to the balance of power issue that in GB, the 
fact that legislative power for IAS is divided amongst devolved 
legislatures, and that Westminster was not considered a barrier to the 
establishment of a peak body. Indeed, it is arguable that the more the 
lines of responsibility for IAS are spread out, the more relevant it is to 
establish a peak coordinating body. Additionally, a peak body can give 
representation to the private sector to enhance a “coherent approach” 
towards regulation.244 
In reality, the need to engage with stakeholders from within and 
outside government is an important coordination feature that merges 
with the composition of coordinating bodies and their associated 
advisory panels—a matter that has already been discussed. The 
advantages of structuring such broadly based panels not only include 
the fact that it gives a voice to a variety of stakeholders, but also extends 
to engaging with stakeholders in a way that allows them to have input 
into the regulatory process. This means that the processes are better 
tailored and understood, and thus more likely to be successful. In 
addition, these panels act as a catalyst for facilitating regulatory 
dialogue. The NISC, for example, provides a one-on-one service, where 
it consults and advises States on the development of management plans 
and strategies. To implement this program more successfully, members 
of the NISC have travelled to States to advise and to “encourage broad 
coordination efforts.”245  
The benefits just discussed and the very fact that governance 
structures in the US and GB establish peak bodies with a significant 
coordination role indicate that PCBs have a crucial role to play. The 
importance of their role is also implicit in the three options proffered by 
Shine, Williams and Gündling—that each depends on the establishment 
of a centralised coordinating body. PCBs therefore offer a better, if not 
the best, solution to the difficulty of harmonising and synchronizing 
regimes across multi layers of government. 
This is not to say, however, that PCBs operate in a vacuum. As the 
Senate Invasive Species Inquiry noted, if the Federal government were 
to take on a more comprehensive role, it would not likely succeed 
without strong support from the States. 
[T]he Commonwealth will be dependent on State and Territory co-
operation by virtue of the distribution of most invasive species. The 
legislation is likely to be ineffective in the management of invasive 
species in Australia if it does not support and encourage other 
 
 243. Id. at 22–24.  
 244. Id. at 25.  
 245. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL (NISC), supra note 126, at 13.  
10/16/2013 10:58 AM   




The Senate’s conclusion clearly acknowledges that centralized 
regulation needs the support of those who actually carry out the ground 
work. Yet, if regimes are to operate along national frameworks, it will 
invariably require some changes to existing institutions and practices, 
even if these are not mandated from the top. Australia’s experience with 
respect to the Weeds of National Significance program demonstrated 
that States found it extremely challenging to participate in national 
frameworks within their existing structures.247 At the same time, as the 
ELI has pointed out, states are hesitant to reconfigure existing 
regulation specifically to introduce new IAS regimes.248 
At the heart of these dilemmas lie issues stemming from the 
Federal-state relationship and in particular, jurisdiction over trade. In 
Australia and the US for example, the Federal government regulates 
international trade and border controls, which cover the movement of a 
significant volume of potentially invasive species.249 Thus, the onus of 
preventing entry of IAS is largely placed on the Federal government, 
while the states are more focused on controlling and eradicating existing 
IAS.250 Accordingly, support by a central body that takes into account 
this division of functions is crucial to the success of nationwide IAS 
regulation.  Moreover, the form that such support takes is important to 
determining governance structures of the IAS regime. It is unlikely, for 
example, that States and Territories would concur on a full-scale 
Federal takeover of IAS regulation. A case in point is the Australasian 
states’ opposition to the Invasive Species Bill. An analogous situation 
exists in the US: a report by the General Accounting Office noted 
resistance by the States to enhancing the legislative underpinning of the 
NISC, even though  
[almost] all of the Invasive Species Advisory Committee . . . 
Officials from USDA, the Department of Defense, and EPA . . . 
[advised] . . . that legislative authority, if properly written, would 
make it easier for Council agencies to implement the management 
plan, as implementing actions under the  executive order are 
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harmonisation of policy and encouragement of uniformity in key 
regulatory indicators, such as uniform definitions.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
This paper undertook a comparative study to evaluate the utility of 
peak bodies as coordinating mechanisms in IAS regimes. In particular, 
the study considered whether such bodies can improve regulation in the 
context of multi-layered regulatory systems—a consideration that is 
particularly important to Federal systems of government.  
The study was prompted by the evolution of IAS regimes in the 
US and GB towards a peak coordinating body model. This contrasts 
with Australia’s regime, which is based on a collection of individual 
components that are loosely coordinated for particular IAS, such as 
those covered by the Weeds of National Significance program. An 
Australian Senate investigation on the feasibility of enhancing Federal 
leadership for IAS concluded that many proposed coordination 
mechanisms would not only duplicate existing measures but also 
trespass upon the division of powers set out in the Australian 
Constitution.  
The reasons the Australian Senate gave for rejecting a greater 
leadership role by the Federal government were context-specific and 
driven by an inquiry to determine whether a Federal, legislative-based 
regime would serve Australia well. Although the Senate vetoed the 
adoption of the legislation, it nevertheless acknowledged that the 
Federal government needed to take a greater leadership role. The 
impediment at the time of the Senate report was the use of a legislative-
based model that was emphatically rejected by the States. The 
experience in the US and GB, however, demonstrates that there are 
advantages to using a peak coordinating body; and that furthermore, 
such a body need not be premised on a central legislature, overriding 
state and territory regimes. Indeed, experience in the US has shown that 
peak coordinating bodies foster a range of formal and informal 
discussions on topics that may not be covered by legislation or 
regulation. This can be particularly crucial in circumstances requiring 
prompt action—for example, when there was an increased risk of IAS 
in the US due to marine debris following the 2012 tsunami in Japan. In 
such cases, a peak coordinating body can serve as a forum for 
discussion and support on how best to address the issue.253 
In reality, the policy approaches of Australia, the US and GB 
recognize that coordination of activities is essential to the success of 
their IAS regimes. Given this broadly similar policy approach, it might 
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have been expected that the regimes themselves would be designed 
along similar lines. Yet, this is not the case and coordination systems in 
Australia lag behind those of the US and GB. The conclusion drawn 
from this study is that the problems faced by Australia in designing an 
effective IAS regime are similar to the problems faced by the US and 
GB at the time of the respective introductions of their systems. The 
Australian regime, however, has not addressed the coordination issue to 
any great extent. Consequently, Australia can benefit by examining 
developments occurring abroad. This is especially helpful in 
jurisdictions where the establishment of peak coordinating bodies draws 
together regulation established at different levels of government; indeed 
making the whole worth more than the sum of its parts. 
 
